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This thesis estimates the costs, implicit as well as
explicit, of three National Service proposals. The three
proposals examined were: (1) a completely voluntary system
as presented by Donald Eberly, the Director of the National
Service Secretariat; (2) a "coercive-voluntary" model
developed by Richard Danzig and Peter Szanton in their book
"National Service: What Would it Mean?"; and (3) a manda-
tory system similar to the military draft of the Vietnam War
era. Costs included were: wages, medical benefits/cover-
age, GI Bill benefits, administrative costs, basic and
specialized training costs, operational costs and recruit-
ing/advertising costs. Additionally, implicit (i.e.,
opportunity) costs were included in Models Two and Three.
Estimates were made only of the costs of the programs. The
assessment of potential benefits from an untested program is
even more problematic than the attempt to estimate economic
costs and is beyond the scope of this thesis.
This research indicates that previous estimates of the
costs of National Service programs may be underestimated by
several billion dollars. In all probability, these esti-
mates were low due to the unintentional exclusion of certain
relevant costs, such as training and implicit costs.
However, it is also possible that conservative assumptions
were used in many previous estimates to make national ser-
vice more politically appealing. It was found that the
voluntary model of Eberly is the least costly, but is also
unrealistic. Greater expenditures in wages and benefits
would be necessary to provide enough incentives to enlist
sufficient volunteers. This thesis suggests a program that
provides better incentives for volunteers and presents a
more realistic cost of a voluntary system.
It is found that the term "National Service," as used
in this context, more accurately describes a job creation
program for lower income youth than a service program de-
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The issue of National Service has been present since it
was first developed by William James in 1910 when he pre-
sented his essay on "The Moral Equivalent of War". He
proposed that America's youth be conscripted into the pro-
gram to fill various needs of society, "get the childishness
knocked out of them" and return to society as more mature
citizens. The same theme is usually presented by today's
National Service Program proponents. Current programs
propose national service as an inexpensive vehicle to meet
many of society's unfilled needs, to provide an avenue for
youth to mature, and to instill a sense of national pride
and duty in today's materialistic youth.
National service is not a single program, but rather
many programs. Essentially, national service volunteers
would be enlisted to provide some form of socially useful
service such as: improving the environment, care of the
elderly, child care or tutoring. Conceptually, the volun-
teers would receive some compensation below the market rate
for the services they provide. The ability of the govern-
ment to provide these services at a cost below their real
value is the most attractive factor to elected officials.
The presence of volunteers, despite the low pay, is assumed
8
by supporters to be an indication of the true spirit of
service that exists in today's youth. Although the basic
benefits of the concept are evident, the vehicle with which
to arrive at those ends is not.
Various models for national service programs have been
presented over the last several decades without any of them
gaining a majority of the support. These range from volun-
tary models, where individuals may choose not to partici-
pate, to mandatory service along the lines of the military
draft. No single program has received endorsement from a
majority of the national service interest groups. This
indecision on a direction for the program to take is pri-
marily responsible for the currently fragmented state of the
issue. The National Service Secretariat in Washington D.C.
is the principal organization lobbying for the acceptance of
a voluntary national service program in Congress.
Congress has been interested in the idea of national
service for many reasons. Some legislators see it as a
means of providing a low cost program to help the needy.
Additionally, providing an avenue for youth to mature and to
gain a better appreciation for their country through public
service is much too appealing for some Congressmen to pass
up. A national service program appears on the surface to be
a political gold mine in which all would benefit at a mini-
mal financial cost to society. Representative McCloskey
presented HR 2206 in the House of Representatives in
February 1979. His proposal, amongst the first, did not
receive wide support in Congress and failed to gain passage.
Included in HR 2206 were several politically distasteful
clauses. Among these was Section 112 which stated that:
Whoever evades or refuses to register in the National
Service System as required under Section 103(a) or fails
to report for induction under Section 108 when ordered
to do so shall be imprisoned for not more than two
years .
This criminal penalty clause, along with the severely
reduced pay rates for junior military enlisted personnel and
the payment of a "subsistence stipend" to volunteers, is too
closely associated with forced work camps and involuntary
servitude to be a politically or socially acceptable option.
The appeal for a national service program continues in
the 100th Congress with the introduction of six new or re-
2
vamped national service bills. These bills range from
discontinuing the current national student loan program and
replacing it with benefits earned from "voluntary" service
as in the case of HR 1749 (Representative David McCurdy) , to
providing matching funds to states with youth service pro-
grams (HR 460 introduced by Representative Leon Panetta)
.
These programs are not as politically distasteful as HR 2206
and may gain greater acceptance, but are not representative
of a complete voluntary national service program.
Senator Albert S. Gore of Tennessee and Senator Paul
Simon of Illinois, both seeking the Democratic Presidential
10
nomination, support a national service program along with
former Democratic Presidential candidate, Gary Hart. The
growing political support at the level of Presidential can-
didates and the increase in the need for these low-cost
services may force the national service issue into the
spotlight in the 1988 presidential election. The increased
interest in this issue is evidenced in a statement by Repre-
sentative Jerry Sikorski , the Chairman of the Human Re-
sources Subcommittee in the House Committee on the Post
Office and Civil Service:
There are too many unmet needs in this country. A
voluntary national youth service could be what we're
looking for .... There is more interest in national
youth service now than there has been in over a decade.
Support for a national service program seems to be
gaining momentum in Congress , as evidenced by the increased
number of national service bills. However, for every sup-
porter of a program there appears to be an equally vocal
opponent
.
Staff assistants to Representative Leon Panetta (D-Cal-
ifornia) stated in October 1987 that a voluntary program
currently stood the best chance of passage in Congress. The
staff further believed that there is approximately a 50-per-
cent chance that the current Congress would pass some type
5
of a national service bill.
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The current political state of the issue is only one of
several factors under consideration on the national service
issue. There are a myriad of serious constitutional, moral,
and ethical questions surrounding the issue. Most of these
questions center around the mandatory and "coercive-volun-
tary" models for national service. The purpose of this
thesis is neither to address these questions nor to address
the issue of the value of benefits provided by the various
models. To address either of these issues would be to un-
necessarily inject additional values of the author into the
analysis. To refrain from including these issues makes the
results of the study more objective and, therefore, a more
valuable tool with which to judge the costs of the various
models
.
It is assumed that a program will pass Congress if it
can be shown to be economical, socially valuable, and has
the clear support of the majority of the electorate. The
value of the benefits derived from each model will be left
for the supporters of the programs to present. Some models
assume that costs will be shared by the federal government,
states and the "local sponsor" of the program. The author's
interest is the cost to society, not to individual segments
or organizations. The costs, therefore, will not be broken




The calculation of implicit costs is necessary to fully
evaluate the costs an individual must bear under each of the
three models. Implicit costs, as used in this thesis, are
essentially the difference between the value of an indivi-
dual's labor and the wages and benefits he receives as com-
pensation from the national service program. The value of
an individual's labor is the amount of compensation an
individual would receive if given the opportunity to select
the use of his time to optimize his income. An individual
who voluntarily selects the national service alternative
under Model One indicates by his selection that national
service is the optimal manner in which to use his time and,
therefore, implicit costs are not included in the
calculation of costs for Model One.
Models Two and Three delay the time when an individual
can choose the occupation which yields his or her optimal
income. By delaying this decision, these two models have
forced the individual to accept a level of income which is
presumably beneath that income the individual would have
commanded if given the opportunity to make the selection
freely. This suboptimal income for the individual neces-
sitates the inclusion of implicit costs in Models Two and
Three.
13
C. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Several estimates of the costs of national service pro-
grams have been completed in the past and, undoubtedly,
several more will be initiated in the future. Most existing
estimates are used as a basis of support for their author's
position on the issue. Estimates by Donald Eberly and Adam
Yarmolinsky, for example, appear to be extremely low to help
support their respective positions. Estimates have also
been made by the Congressional Budget Office and the Depart-
7ment of Defense. None of the estimates which currently
exist include implicit costs, and therefore, are not a true
measure of the costs of the program.
Eberly and Yarmolinsky estimated the cost of a 1 mil-
lion-member program at $5.5 billion and $3 billion, respec-
tively, in 1979. At the same time, the Committee for the
Q
Study of National Service estimated a cost of $8 billion
,
more than twice the amount of Yarmolinsky ' s estimate.
Which, if any of these, are reliable estimates? Who is
using the numbers to support a personal cause?
The issue of national service appears to have the
potential, as former Senator Gary Hart put it, to "be the
biggest issue of the 1980 's". Existing cost information is
inaccurate and misleading and could conceivably be used in
the selection of one program over another or even in the
selection of national service in general. The emphasis of
this thesis is to provide more accurate and useful estimates
14
of costs to help decision-makers to make more informed and
intelligent decisions on the issue.
The majority of existing literature on the subject of
national service is written by relatively few individuals in
support of their position. However, the lines of the battle
over this issue are not clearly defined. The issue is not
over only what type of program should be instituted, but
also if some models are even constitutionally permissible.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is perhaps
the strongest opponent of any mandatory or "coercive-
voluntary" system. It has stated that:
Social and economic arguments for conscription as social
engineering amount to justifications for involuntary
servitude by the young to save money or inconvenience
for their elders. The Union opposes in principle the
conception of compulsory non-military service precisely
because of its compulsory feature .... This kind of
system would amount to involuntary servitude prohibited
by the Thirteenth Amendment. The socially desirable
ends . . . are praiseworthy . . . , but must be achieved
by a system resting on free choice and economic
inducement ....
It is highly probably, in light of the ACLU ' s state-
ments, that any non-voluntary system of national service
would be challenged in the courts on the basis of its
constitutionality.
Although the ACLU ' s position that any mandatory system
would be unconstitutional seems to be supportable, others
have questioned the intent of the Founding Fathers when the
"involuntary servitude" amendment was written. They believe
15
this is restricted solely to prohibit slavery for private
masters, not for the state.
Supporters of a voluntary system, such as Eberly,
assume that once the idea of national service becomes in-
grained in American society, "... youth service would
become a much needed rite of passage for many young Ameri-
12
cans." A 1977 Gallup Poll, indicating that a national
service program was favored by almost 2 to 1 , would appear
to support this view. However, when the likely volunteers
(18-24 year olds) were polled by Gallup in the same survey,
the results indicated that 47 percent were favorable toward
13
national service while 50 percent were opposed. These are
the percentages that should be used, since the 18-24 year
olds are the group who will be called upon to volunteer.
Contrary to the "rite of passage," newspaper articles are
written almost daily stressing that today's youth are more
concerned with money than ever before. An article carried
by the Associated Press entitled "Money More Vital to 1990
Class" plainly points this out. The American Council on
Education, in conjunction with UCLA's Higher Education
Research Institute, found that .71 percent of the 280,000
college freshmen they interviewed placed "being very well
off financially" as their primary goal. The shift in the
value of money to youth is evident when compared to the
results of the same basic study conducted in 1967. In 1967,
83 percent of the youth interviewed stated "developing a
16
meaningful philosophy of life" was at the top of their
, . . 14list
.
The Department of Defense did a study on the effects of
a national service program on military recruiting and found
that until the program gets large, the effect on the mili-
tary is negligible. Population projections for the 17- to
21-year-old male population show a declining trend of avail-
able youth to meet the demands of the military. Assuming
that the percent of high school graduates remains relatively
constant, the number of individuals available and qualified
1 fito enter the military will decline into the near future.
The implementation of a large national service program
would accentuate this decline at the program's beginning.
However, by all estimates, after the program reached a
steady state, the number of people completing their service
17
would approximately equal the number newly entering.
The decline in 17- to 21-year-olds, from approximately
10.8 million in 1980 to 9.0 million in 1990, 18 should reduce
youth unemployment to an acceptable level; yet, this is one
of the basic problems which supporters of national service
indicate their programs will solve.
These represent only the major areas of conflict. Dif-
ferences in specific programs and options, as well as these
major areas, prevent any analysis of the costs of the issue
without the use of assumptions.
17
D. ASSUMPTIONS
Many sides of the national service issue remain unre-
solved and in a fluid state. This facet of the issue neces-
sitates the use of multiple assumptions in any meaningful
analysis. The basic assumptions that are incorporated in
this analysis are listed here.
,
The constitutionality of the mandatory programs for
national service is left to the courts to decide. The first
assumption of this thesis is that all programs analyzed are
constitutional , or that an amendment to the constitution
could be passed to permit the program. while this may not
be particularly realistic, the issue of constitutionality
does not directly affect the costs of the programs, and
therefore is not relevant to this study.
The effects of a national service program on youth
unemployment will not be addressed. The assumption is made
that any effect of a program to reduce the level of unem-
ployment is a benefit, not a cost, and the valuation of that
benefit is left to future studies.
A basic assumption inherent in the analysis of this
paper is that youth will tend to act out of self-interest.
This assumption is not intended to imply that all youth are
solely interested in money; however, their willingness to
provide service to society steadily decreases as the price
they must pay climbs. This assumption is needed to judge
the incentives and benefits necessary to entice volunteers
18
into the program as well as to calculate implicit costs. If
youth follow Utopian ideals instead of acting out of self-
interest, any estimate of the incentives necessary to enlist
volunteers would be purely subjective. In light of the UCLA
study referenced above, this assumption seems valid.
To simplify calculation of costs and provide a more
meaningful analysis of the program's potential costs, I
assume that the programs are not phased in over time, as
their proponents suggest, but instead are brought to full
strength as quickly as possible. The phase-in costs will be
substantially below the costs of the programs at full
strength and are not a meaningful indication of the
program's true costs.
The "coercive-voluntary" model is essentially volun-
tary, but participation is encouraged using negative incen-
tives for non-participants. According to Danzig and
Szanton , any individual who does not complete his or her
service would be assessed a 5 percent surtax on his or her
personal income tax liability. When service is completed,
the surtax would be removed. In this model the assumption
is made, that the 5 percent surtax is a strong negative
incentive for individuals to "volunteer" and that all indi-
viduals will volunteer to avoid the tax. Additionally, it
is assumed that the only model of Danzig and Szanton' s which
may receive public support is the model which establishes a
"cut-off date" for the program. The cut-off date would be
19
used to prevent the surtax from being assessed on citizens
beyond the roughly 25-year-old age group. These are essen-
tially very realistic assumptions, since human nature dic-
tates that most people would prefer to "get the service out
of the way" now than pay the tax for the remainder of their
lives. Additionally, the majority of the population, post-
service age, would be hesitant to tax themselves for a
program they did not have the option of choosing at an
earlier age. It also seems reasonable to assume that they
would not interrupt their prime earning years to enroll in
the program.
The last basic assumption is that it is very realistic
to assume that some of the money presently spent on youth,
welfare, and even law enforcement could be redirected
towards a national service program if one were enacted. The
amount of money that could be involved would be a very rough
estimate; however some funds could be redirected. In ref-
erence to the anticipated decrease in law enforcement costs,
a recent study has shown that "job opportunities targeted to
(the) high-risk black teenage population have the additional
1
9
beneficial effect of reducing crime rates." The redi-
rected money could be used to reduce the net additional
costs of a national service program. However, this research
is primarily interested in the gross cost of the program.
The use of redirected money to reduce the cost of the pro-
20
gram is therefore essentially a way to provide funding
(which is a matter beyond the scope of this paper)
.
E. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is to estimate the costs
of three representative national service models, given
stated assumptions. The inclusion of costs essentially
excluded in other studies is key to the accuracy of this
study's results. The total costs of the proposals must be
evaluated prior to making an intelligent decision on which,





This chapter reviews the general methodology used in
the calculation of costs for each of the models presented.
Each model requires different assumptions which yield
substantially different estimates for each cost category.
Separate descriptions of each model, associated assumptions,
and a brief synopsis of the methods used in each model to
estimate values appear on the following pages. The infor-
mation is presented in a format that makes for easy
comparison of the three models.
Implicit costs, which arise in the "coercive- voluntary"
and mandatory models, differ significantly in their calcula-
tion from other costs, and for that reason are discussed
separately at this point in the paper.
A. CALCULATION OF IMPLICIT (I.E., OPPORTUNITY) COSTS
Implicit costs, as discussed in Chapter 2, essentially
arise when the true value of an individual's time/labor is
not adequately reflected in his or her wages and other com-
pensation. Normally, this situation results in a loss to
the individual, as in the case of national service. The
monetary value associated with this difference in wages and
compensation is the implicit cost that must be "paid" by the
22
individual. Although this cost will not be paid by the
government or a sponsoring organization , it must be borne by
the individual and, therefore, is very appropriately in-
cluded as a cost of any program under which it occurs. In
the case of national service, Models Two and Three include
implicit costs.
Implicit costs, as stated above, arise due to the
differential between the value of an individual's labor and
the wages this person is "forced" to accept for it. The
proposed wages and compensation received by a person in a
national service program are relatively simple to calculate.
The value of the compensation is the combined value of the
wages and GI Bill benefits received by the member. Medical
benefits are not included since most employers provide
health plans for their employees. Assuming the benefits
provided by each health plan are equal, the use of the value
of the plan to calculate implicit costs would be improper.
This is true because implicit costs are the difference
between compensation received and compensation foregone when
the individual was inducted into the national service pro-
gram. Since medical benefits of equal value appear in each
compensation package, no difference exists. Values can be
estimated for each of these factors to provide a reasonable
value for compensation and wages for each member. Training
costs are purposefully left out of the calculation of com-
pensation. It is possible that an individual will use the
23
training he or she received in the national service program
upon return to society. This would especially manifest
itself in the case of training in a marketable skill such as
carpentry or as a healthcare worker. Although the potential
exists for this training to act as a benefit for the train-
ee, the value can not be reasonably estimated due to the
diverse paths a national service participant can follow
after completion of the service. It is assumed that only a
small portion of volunteers will use the skill they were
trained for in the national service program. The values of
compensation and benefits will be presented in the analysis
section of the thesis.
The estimate of the value of wages and compensation is
relatively simple, but the calculation of the individual's
foregone wage is more complicated. Essentially, one major
assumption is necessary to aid in the simplification of
these calculations. It is assumed that the percentages of
workers in the labor force in each field will remain at the
current level in the future (i.e., the percent of the labor
force of each occupation will remain constant over time)
.
While this is not accurate in the long term, it is essen-
tially accurate enough in the short term for the purposes of
this study. The current technological advances in the
electronics and medical industries, as well as the overall
shift of jobs to the service sector, will undoubtedly shift
the percentages over time.
24
To arrive at a value for an individual's forgone wages,
20
the 16-24 year-old age group was used. Although this is
not the age group of individuals expected to enter the
programs, the data is not available for the 18 year-old age
group. The net effect of including youth younger and older
than the targeted age group should , on the whole , balance
out. Although a portion of the group would go to college,
and thereby increase their actual wage value, the group was
treated as though it were a homogeneous body that would
enter the work force soon after graduation from high school
.
The percentage of people projected to enter each career path
was assumed to be equal to the percentages of the current
labor force in the respective field. The average wage was
calculated using data from the Bureau of the Census. It
should be noted that the average wage, as used here, rep-
resents the weighted mean wage for 18 year-olds, not the
average wage for all workers.
The value of the foregone wages and compensation was
calculated as described above. However, simply to compare
this to the value for wages and compensation received by the
national service volunteers would be to improperly present
the implicit costs. Not only does the national service
participant pay implicit costs for the two years he or she
is in the program, but also for the duration of his or her
working life. This is true because a participant's post-
service career path will generally not provide the same
25
wages upon completion of service that would have been ob-
tained if the person had gone straight into the labor force.
Since wage increases are made up not only of inflation
adjustments, but also of longevity adjustments, the t+2
(present time plus two years) wages of a non-participant
will differ from the t + 2 wages of a national service
participant. An example may help to clarify this point:
Assuming a 3.0-percent annual increase (1.5-percent for
increased productivity of labor in general and 1.5-per-
cent for increased productivity as the individual be-
comes more experienced) occurs in perpetuity, the wages
of a non-participant will be 106.1 percent higher at t+2
than at t=0. The same wages for the national service
participant will be only 103 percent higher. This pay
differential is carried through until retirement.
The following formula was used to encompass this per-
petual pay differential and the difference in wages while
the participant is completing his or her service:
IMPLICIT COSTS = Present Value of the non-participant's
wages (PV ) minus the Present Value of the national
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W is the 18 year-old average wage
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W is the national service program wage (dependent on
the model)
r is the 3 percent combined productivity adjustment
discounted at 10 percent (i.e., 1.03/1.10)
s is the 1.5 percent general productivity only
adjustment discounted at 10 percent (i.e., 1.015/1.10)
By replacing the words in the implicit cost equation
with the above numerical values, the author derived the
following equation, used for analysis purposes in Chapter 4.
IMPLICIT COSTS = 2.3128 WQ - 1.9227 Wng
The 10 percent real discount rate was chosen since it
seems a reasonable rate to use for youth; they tend to have
high time preference. This equation takes into account not
only the immediate effects of service on wages, but also the
lifelong effects on an individual's earning power.
Compensation received by a program participant that
exceeds the compensation that he or she would have received
by not participating in the program is treated as economic
rent. Sjaastad and Hansen wrote that "... the government
abides by the ethical norm of our society that surpluses
. . . are properly the property of the person to whom they
21
normally accrue." In keeping with accepted practices, the
author has chosen to treat economic rents (i.e., "negative
implicit costs") as simply a benefit to the individuals who
receive them.
27
Implicit costs are the only costs treated substantially
differently in each of the three models. All other cost
areas are essentially the same, but use differing assump-
tions and, therefore, need to be presented separately. Each
cost category (i.e., wages, training, etc.) is discussed
separately with distinctions made between each model.
General model descriptions are presented here to acquaint
the reader with the characteristics of each program.
B. GENERAL MODEL DESCRIPTIONS
1 . Voluntary Model
The voluntary program, Model One, contains two
major differences from the other two models. First, the
voluntary model does not include implicit costs in any
calculations. The reason for this exclusion: there are no
implicit costs when individuals are free to choose the
optimal use of their time. The second major difference is
in the scope of the program. According to Eberly, a volun-
tary national service program should be designed to accom-
22
modate one million volunteers. This differs by greater
than a factor of 3 from the over three million inductees
23that could be expected in either Model Two or Three.
Eberly' s program, used as the basis for Model One,
proposes that wages for volunteers be paid at a rate of 90
percent of the existing minimum wage, currently $3.35 per
hour. Eberly also believes a good program should "emphasize
28
education and training;" have "training appropriate to the
work to be performed and a sort of GI Bill that would offer
a year of education for each year of service." Addition-
ally, he believes, as does the author, that full medical
24benefits should be provided to the volunteers.
Eberly's program assumes that volunteers will
continue to live in their community, not be relocated to
perform service, and that they will continue to live with
their parents. Since this is a community-based program, it
is assumed that all volunteers will be used in their
respective communities.
Eberly states that "it would be important not to
25try to do everything at once." He favors a 3-year phase-
in of the program to allow for modifications as the size of
the program grows. This is completely supported by the
author. However, as stated in the assumptions in Chapter 2,
the interest of this study is to provide cost estimates at a
steady state condition, not in the initial phases of the
program when costs are lower.
2. "Coercive-Voluntary" Model
This proposal, Model Two, is essentially the
26program presented by Danzig and Szanton. The major cost
difference between this program and the voluntary one is the
inclusion of implicit costs. Implicit costs were calculated
as described previously, and included to make the cost
estimate more accurate.
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This program could have over 3.5 million partici-
pants. The Bureau of the Census projection of the popula-
27tion of 18-year-olds in 1987 is 3.525 million. However,
this would be an inaccurate estimate of the actual number of
volunteers that could be expected in the program because
some would undoubtedly be found either mentally or physi-
cally ineligible. In a study prepared for the Department of
Defense, approximately 75 percent of American youths would
qualify for the Army or Navy on the basis of current minimum
28
aptitude and education criteria. This is a very liberal
estimate since it does not include physical or moral screen-
ing. The actual rate would be lower. Since the military's
current requirements for entry are probably more stringent
than entry requirements for a national service program might
be, the author has decided to use a 90 percent eligibility
rate for young people. This assumes that there are a number
of national service jobs that could be filled by young
people who may not be able to qualify for today's military
because of low aptitude scores, physical problems, or a
questionable moral background. A number of individuals
would still be excused from participating for various
reasons. Using this 90 percent eligibility rate, 3.1725
million "volunteers" are expected to participate in this
program.
Wages in Danzig and Szanton's program are set at
two-thirds of the minimum wage. The remaining one-third is
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to be paid upon the successful completion of service.
Essentially, for analytical purposes, this means that the
wage rate is the minimum wage. A small difference between
using the pay schedule supplied by Danzig and Szanton and
the one used by the author for analysis surfaces due to the
time value of money. Payments received upon completion of
service, 2 years from the participant's entry into the
program, have a net present value (NPV) lower than the NPV
of receiving the extra one-third payment throughout parti-
cipation in the program. However, this difference is small.
Danzig and Szanton state that educational benefits (i.e., GI
29Bill) would not be effective, so none are included in this
model. Although, Danzig and Szanton' s proposal does not
specifically address medical benefits, it is assumed that
benefits consistent with the other two programs would be
included in their program.
3. Mandatory Model
The last model is patterned after the draft-era
military. The program is expected to include the same
number of participants as Model Two, 3.1725 million.
Implicit costs are a necessary part of this model
,
as they
were in the "coercive-voluntary" model. Full medical
benefits are included as well as GI Bill educational bene-
fits. Wages under this model present a problem and, due to
several factors, are difficult to determine. To use the
draft-era wages paid to junior enlisted personnel, adjusted
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for inflation, would be to present an inaccurate value for
this cost category. This is true for mainly two reasons.
First, although those wages did exist, they were not an
accurate measure of the wages junior personnel should have
received. As the Gates Commission stated in 1970: "regard-
less of the fate of the draft, the Commission strongly
recommends elimination of this discrimination against first
termers." Secondly, junior enlisted personnel did not
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receive any pay increase from 1952 through 1964, a matter
that would not be received well if the same "wage freeze"
had applied to the civilian sector. For these reasons, the
author believes that military wages would have been raised
regardless of the decision to go to an All-Volunteer Force
in 1973. To use current wages for an E-2 with less than 2
32years of service ($738.00) for a wage rate would be to
most likely exaggerate the wages that today 1 s recruits would
have received if the draft were still intact. A Department
of Defense study points out:
Three-fourths of all cost increases associated with the
AVF (All-Volunteer Force) have been the result of pay
raises for the most junior personnel, pay raises that
would have been justified on the basis of -fairness and
equity even if the draft had been retained.
This estimate by the Department of Defense seems
supportable for several reasons. Moreover, if pay had not
been raised to an acceptable level , the result would prob-
ably have been a higher turnover rate with associatively
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higher training costs for new personnel. Wages (monthly
rates) used under this model were calculated as follows
:
Base Pay for an E-2 (<2 years) in 1987 was: $738.00^
Base Pay for an E-2 (<2 years) in 1973 was: $342.30
Gross pay differential is: $396.70
The wage rate used for this model , 1973 Base Pay
plus 50 percent of the Gross pay differential, is $541. The
author uses 50 percent as a subjective estimate of the raise
which would have occurred regardless of the fate of the
draft. The 1973 Base Pay would equal $852 if adjusted for
inflation; therefore, using a value over $300 less per month
does not seem unreasonable.
The pay rate of $214 ($321 in 1987 dollars) pro-
posed in 1979 by Senator McCloskey in HR 2206 will be
analyzed and presented for comparison purposes. The actual
value of wages received will have no impact on the final
cost of the program, since higher wages paid result in lower
implicit costs and vice versa. The only impact is on the
budget dollars--the money paid by the government--and on the
compensation which the individual will receive.
C. COST CATEGORIES
Each cost category has some aspects that are unique to
it and do not apply to other cost categories. These will be
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discussed here with distinctions made between each model to
aid in readability.
1. Wages
The current minimum wage of $3.35 per hour, used in
Models One and Two, has been in effect since 1981 and is
under great pressure for an upward adjustment. If the 1981
minimum wage had been indexed using the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), it would now stand at $4.09 per hour. Senator Edward
Kennedy of Massachusetts has presented a bill in the Senate
that would cause an incremental raising of the minimum wage
as follows: January 1, 1988, to $3.85 per hour; January 1,
1989 to $4.25; January 1, 1990, to $4.65. After December
31, 1990 the minimum wage would be indexed, presumably to
adjust for inflation. The current minimum wage of $3.35
per hour will be used for calculations and analysis.
Although the current minimum wage is used in this analysis,
the reader should note that a raise in the minimum wage is
highly probably in the near future, and that any raise will
directly effect the costs of the voluntary and coercive-
voluntary programs. In fact, California legislators have
already passed a raise in the minimum wage paid in Cali-
fornia to $4.25 per hour. although the Governor has vetoed
this raise, he has publicly supported a raise in the minimum
wage to an hourly rate of $4.00.
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2. Medical Benefits
The value of medical benefits was calculated using
the annual cost of group health insurance for youths in the
18-year-old age group. Insurance companies' estimates for
group health insurance averaged $44.70 per month, which
37
amounts to $536 annually. The government estimate for the
value of medical coverage is $702 per year for a member of
O Q
the armed forces. This value is calculated using the
Civil Service health plan, which contains essentially the
same coverage as does military care. The major problem with
using this value is that it is an average value for all age
groups. As a person grows older, the cost of health insur-
ance rises. Using this value would essentially inflate the
value of health coverage to younger people and would do so
in the case of the national service volunteers. Danzig and
Szanton use $500 as a value for medical benefits in their
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analysis. Since the author's medical insurance value and
the Danzig/Szanton value are consistent, the $536 value will
be used for analysis purposes.
The value of medical benefits is the same, on an
individual basis, regardless of the model and will differ
only in relation to the scope of the program and the number
of participants.
3. GI Bill Benefits
The exact value of GI Bill benefits is difficult to
ascertain. The percentage of individuals who participate in
35
the program and the cost-per-individual varies dramatically
depending on the program involved. The only realistic way
to get a value for this benefit is to use participation
rates from Veterans Administration (VA) records. There are
two factors to be considered. The first factor is the
average participation rate of individuals in the program.
It is assumed that the GI Bill benefits are one of the
primary reasons individuals would enter the program volun-
tarily and, thus, higher than average participation rates
can be expected. The Veterans Administration records indi-
cate an average usage rate of 66 percent for Vietnam War-era
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veterans. Although the usage rate for Vietnam veterans is
greater than that of veterans of the Korean War or World War
II, it is felt that the Vietnam-era rate reflects current
trends better than other existing data. The 66 percent
usage rate for Vietnam veterans represents individuals who
used any portion of their benefits. The percentage of
veterans using their full benefits is substantially lower.
Since the 66 percent usage rate includes both full-time and
part-time use of benefits to use it would be to overestimate
the educational benefits available to participants. To
adjust the 66 percent rate for partial usage, the author has
chosen to use a rate of 50 percent for an estimate of prob-
able use by national service participants. This rate is in
agreement with the 50 percent rate used by Sjaastad and
Hansen in their estimates for the Gates Commission. The
36
rate of participation by national service participants,
which is expected to be higher, is highly speculative at
best. GI Bill benefits are a major factor in recruiting new
42
enlisted personnel, and can be expected to affect national
service volunteers in a like manner. Since educational
benefits are a big "drawing card" for the military and a
large percentage of national service volunteers are expected
to join for the educational benefits, the author has chosen
to use the adjusted value of 50 percent for the expected
participation rate in this program.
The second consideration is the amount of benefits
that each individual would receive for his service. The
only government program currently in existence that offers
educational benefits consistent with those envisioned for
the national service program is the "New GI Bill" . In light
of this fact, the "New GI Bill" will be used as a model to
evaluate educational benefits. It will be assumed that,
since educational benefits are a primary reason for joining
the national service program, the percentage of youth ex-
pected to use their educational benefits will obtain the
maximum benefits available. The current payment of benefits
to veterans is $342 per month for veterans with no depen-
dents in a full-time institution. 3 The current value of
benefits, $342, was last raised in 1981 and may be raised
again in the near future. Eligibility is accrued at a rate
of one-and-one-half months per month of military service.
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Since any educational benefits earned could not be
used until after completion of the participant's service,
all values of benefits were discounted for two years at a
rate of 10 percent to provide a more accurate estimate of
their present value.
4. Administrative Costs
Eberly proposed that administrative costs could be
held to 15 percent of wages during the initial stages of the
program and then decline to 10 percent as the program
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matures. Since the interest of this thesis is to evaluate
costs when the program is out of the initial stages and has
reached a steady state condition, the value of 10 percent
will be used for each model's administration costs. Danzig
and Szanton estimated administrative costs at 9 percent of
46total other costs. Eberly' s estimate is based on 10 per-
cent of wages only . Due to Eberly' s experience with ACTION
and other organizations and the consistency of the above
estimates in this cost area, his estimate of administrative
costs will be used in all models analyzed.
5. Training Costs
Eberly proposes that only 2 days of training would
be necessary for national service participants. The cost of
this training is estimated by Eberly at $100 in 1979 dollars
47($150 in 1987 dollars). This cost would cover pre-service
orientation and training conducted by the organization
receiving the services of the volunteer. This value, in
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1987 dollars, will be used in calculations for the voluntary
model. It is felt by the author that two days of training
is insufficient for this type of activity and that a "mini-
basic training camp" covering a period of 4 weeks would be
needed. The proposed training would include "health and
sanitation, physical conditioning, and the elements of
48
community living." This type of basic training was pro-
posed by William Kennedy in his February 1979 paper, "Na-
49tional Service as an Alternative to the Draft." For any
national service program to work, it seems necessary that
those involved be trained in these basic areas prior to
starting their service. It is especially important for
volunteers who would service in a group environment or for
volunteers in the health and child care fields.
The only currently existing organization that
trains large numbers of people in these areas is the mili-
tary "boot camp" system. It should be noted that the mili-
tary "boot camp" is currently 8 weeks in duration and the
proposed "mini-boot camp" for the national service parti-
cipants is only 4 weeks. Congressional Budget Office per-
sonnel estimated that the cost to train one new recruit was
$6,000 in 1977. At the time of the CBO estimate, boot
camp was 12 weeks in duration. To tailor the training cost
of the CBO to a national service program, the author adjust-
ed the CBO estimate for inflation and took one-third of the
CBO estimate to compensate for different durations of the
39
training camps. This estimate, adjusted as described above,
is $3,700 as it would apply to the national service pro-
grams. Although military boot camp costs include some costs
which would not be found in the national service camps
,
these costs are generally small and, therefore, no
adjustment is made for them.
Some additional or specialized training would be
needed for many of the volunteers that could not be received
"on-the-job" . This specialized training would be needed for
those volunteers entering the health care fields primarily
and to a lessor degree in some other fields. Since any
specialized training is not addressed in the existing
models, none is included in the calculation of costs for
this study. Readers should note that these costs would
increase the overall cost of each program.
6. Operating Costs
Operating costs include items such as the cost of
transportation, food and housing for volunteers displaced
from their community, and so on. Daily transportation costs
to and from the volunteer's place of service, in a commun-
ity-based plan, would conceivably be covered with the indi-
vidual's own resources. However, the transportation cost of
an individual from his home of record to the basic training
camp and to his place of service, in Models Two and Three,
should be a cost that either is provided for initially or is
40
a reimbursable expense item. This is not uncommon and in
fact is done in both the military and the Peace Corps.
The remaining subsistence costs, food and shelter,
under model One, would be an out-of-pocket expense for the
volunteer to be paid for from his or her stipend. Total
food, shelter, and transportation costs for the volunteer
would consume nearly all of the individual's monthly
stipend
.
Model One, as presented by Eberly, is a community-
based program. Therefore, it is assumed that the vast major-
ity of volunteers would provide service in their community
and continue to live at home at no cost to the government or
sponsors. The assumption that volunteers will remain in
their community and continue to live at home implies that
the volunteer's parents will continue to provide food and
shelter to their child when in other circumstances they may
not have chosen to do so. It appears that this is using the
parents to subsidize the costs of the program. However,
what is actually occurring is a transfer payment from the
parent to the volunteer. If the program were not commun-
ity-based
,
the volunteers would pay for food and shelter
themselves. However, since this is a community-based pro-
gram and parents are paying for these expenses, they are
actually paying for expenses their child would have incurred
anyway. It should be noted that the number of volunteers
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would be significantly lower if this were not a community-
based program and if additional funds were not provided to
the volunteer to pay these expenses.
Models Two and Three do not assume the volunteer
will live at home. Presumably, then, the program would
provide food and shelter for all participants. The author
uses the Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Basic
Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) provided to members of the
military as a surrogate to measure the value of these
benefits. BAQ and BAS are given to military members who do
not receive government- provided housing and/or food. BAQ
and BAS rates are established to compensate the individual
for the value of these services and, therefore, can be used
as a surrogate measure to accurately determine food and
housing costs for a national service program. The current
rates for BAQ and BAS are $155.40 and $182.10, respective-
51ly. These values and all other military wages and bene-
fits are for an E-2 with less than 2 years of service. The
E-2 rates apply to individuals with greater than 6 months of
service and less than 2 years. The total, $337.50, will be
used to determine the value of operations costs in Models
Two and Three
.
One additional housing cost, Variable Housing
Allowance (VHA) , is provided to members of the military who
reside in high cost areas of the country. The amount of
this allowance is intended to compensate individuals for
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excessive housing costs. Since individuals in a national
service program would be expected to live in a group envi-
ronment, not in individual units, this allowance does not
apply.
7. Recruiting /Advertising/ Testing Costs
Costs of advertising/recruiting for volunteers are
another area in which it is relatively difficult to compile
specific cost data. The armed forces spent approximately
$400 million in 1979 on advertising and recruiting to enlist
52400,000 volunteers. This averages to $1,000 per enlistee.
The advertising costs along were $50 million or $125 per
volunteer53 $231 in current dollars) . To include all costs
in this area would be to overstate the cost for the volun-
tary program. However, at a minimum, the $231 per volunteer
advertising cost should be included in any credible cost
analysis
.
Costs would be higher per person under either Model
Two or Three due to the inclusion of recruiting costs, which
were excluded in the voluntary model. The total cost in the
draft era, pre 1973, which most closely resembles Models Two
and Three, for recruiting and advertising for the armed
forces was approximately $220 million (1977 dollars) or $550
54per person. * In 1987 dollars this equates to $1,018 per
person .
An additional cost that is treated as a cost of
recruiting is the cost of an initial physical examination
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and mental testing. Any program on this scale would neces-
sitate an entry physical exam and some paper and pencil
testing. The physical examination is necessary to screen
out any volunteers with potentially contagious diseases and
provide a measure of their basic physical fitness prior to
engaging in strenuous work. The mental testing is needed to
provide program administrators with a basic gauge of an
individual's aptitudes and intellectual abilities.
Physical exam costs would differ for male and for
55female volunteers , but would average about $203 per person
(current dollars). The cost of any required testing is
relatively low, estimated at $4.50 per person (current
dollars. 56
8. Miscellaneous Costs
Social Security costs could be a small
,
but mean-
ingful expense of a national service program. The govern-
ment, as the employer, would have to match payments received
from the individual, which amount to 7.15 percent of a
participant's wages. The use of this cost for analysis
purposes would probably overstate total costs. In addition
use of this cost would be misleading, because it is money
that, although collected now from the employer, would be
spent later on recipients of social security income. In
this sense, it is essentially a transfer payment, not a
cost, and is consequently not included in any of the model's
cost estimates. If this expense were included, it would
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approach $500 million for Model One and $1.7 billion for
Models Two and Three.
The cost of any lawsuits brought against a national
service participant that result from his or her service work
is not covered in this analysis. Negligence in the health
care field, day-care services, and in other areas could
conceivably bring about lawsuits. Since the participants
work for the government, it is assumed that any settlement
would be paid by the government. There is no realistic
means of estimating this cost for a program that has not yet
been accurately designed. Some cost in this area would
surely exist, which is why it is brought out here, but the
cost at this time is considered immeasurable.
The last cost category that could have a signifi-
cant impact if a large scale program were enacted is the
increased cost of labor resulting from a shortage of youths
to fill jobs conventionally held by entry-level workers.
Assuming an unemployment rate among young people of 17
percent and that there are approximately 3.5 million youths
aged 18, there are approximately 595,000 unemployed young
people in the nation. The. minimum number of individuals
involved in any of these proposals is 1 million in the
voluntary model. If the full 1 million, or 3.1725 million
in the case of Models Two and Three , were active in the
program, the result would be an extreme shortage of youths
in the civilian labor force. This would cause a one-time
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rise in wage rates. The extent of this effect is not known,
but it would nonetheless occur.
These miscellaneous costs would be difficult, if
not impossible , to calculate or even estimate and for that
reason are not included in any calculation. They are simply
presented for further thought by the reader.
The reader should keep in mind that some of the
costs included in this analysis, such as training costs and
expenses on advertising, are not necessarily new costs. To
some extent they simply replace expenses which would have
occurred under the All-Voluntary Force. If the number of
enlistees in the military remains constant, and the cost per
enlistee for advertising is the same for the military and
national service programs, the net effect would be to offset
one cost to the government with another. The actual outcome
might be that advertising for a national service program is
a cost savings for the government as a whole. Cost savings,
however, are defined in this analysis as benefits and
treatment of benefits are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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III. DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Using the methodology described in Chapter 3 and addi-
tional data, four program costs are presented and analyzed.
These programs are: (1) Voluntary, (2) "Coercive-Volun-
tary", (3) Mandatory using the author's wage estimates, and
(4) Mandatory using the wage estimates of HR 2206. The
costs which were included in the analysis were: Wages,
Medical and Educational (GI Bill) benefits, Administrative
Costs, Training Costs, Operating Costs, Recruiting/Adver-
tising Costs and Initial Testing (including a physical
examination) Costs. The only additional costs analyzed are
the implicit costs included in the Coercive-Voluntary and
Mandatory programs.
Each program is described separately in detail followed
by a tabular comparison of results.
All one-time costs (i.e., recruiting, physical exami-
nation, and so on) are allocated equally over the two years
the individual is involved in the program. All costs are
expressed on an annual basis at 1987 levels.
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B. VOLUNTARY PROGRAM
For several reasons, the voluntary program, as defined,
is the most different among the programs analyzed. GI Bill
benefits are calculated according to Eberly's proposal and
provide 1 year of educational benefits for each year of
service completed. All other programs that provide educa-
tional benefits allow 1-1/2 months of benefits for each
month of service completed. This is consistent with the
existing GI Bill. Training Costs for this program include
only 2 days of orientation instead of the 4-week "mini-boot
camp" proposed by the other programs. Operating costs do
not exist for this program for reasons already noted: the
costs are simply a transfer payment. Implicit costs are not
included in the cost of the voluntary program for reasons
previously presented. The final difference between the
voluntary program and all others is in the calculation of
recruiting/advertising costs for this model. Since it was
assumed that the proposed compensation was adequate to
attract sufficient volunteers to the program, it was also
assumed that recruiting costs should not be a part of this
program. The only expense necessary would be expenditures
for advertising needed to inform prospective volunteers of
the options available to them, of where to join, and so on.
This differs from the other models which include recruiting
as well as advertising costs.
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An * indicates costs that would have to be budgeted for
by the government and/or sponsoring organization.
1 . Voluntary Program Analysis
Wages(*): 90 percent of the
minimum wage of $3.35 per hour
for 50 40-hour work weeks = $6,030
Medical Benefits(*): $44.70
(monthly health insurance
average) x 12 months = $536
Administrative Costs(*): 10 per-
cent of the annual wage cost = $603
Training Costs(*): Estimated
by Eberly at $150 (adjusted) for
a two-day orientation period = $75
Operating Costs: None included =
Educational Benefits(*): Assuming
2 years of service is completed:
2 years of benefits at $342 per








of program participants: 24 months x
$342/month x 50 percent = $1,696
(This has been discounted for two






Total Cost for One Individual =
x 1 million volunteers =
Budgeted Cost for One Individual =
C. "COERCIVE-VOLUNTARY" PROGRAM
The Coercive-Voluntary program differs from the volun-
tary program in several significant ways. The first and
most notable is the absence of any educational benefits
under this program. Danzig and Szanton state that they do
not believe educational benefits have a significant impact
on the behavior of individuals and that the existence or
lack of benefits affects only the type of educational insti-
tution a student attends. The authors assume that students
tend toward 2-year schools when educational aid is not
available, and that they tend toward 4-year schools when it
is. Training costs of this model incorporate the concept of
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the "mini-boot camp" and, therefore, are much higher than
the training costs under the voluntary model. Operating
costs are presented under the assumption that the partici-
pants of this program will be paid the military BAQ and BAS
rates, or provided equivalent housing and food, and that the
program will not necessarily be community-based. Recruiting
costs as well as implicit costs are added to this model for
reasons previously noted.
The major difference other than the cost categories is
the scope of the program. This program assumes full parti-
cipation by youth, except for the 10 percent determined to
be physically or mentally ineligible. This, therefore,
assumes that 3.1725 million youth will participate. As
stated in Chapter 3, the tax surcharge proposed by Danzig
and Szanton is assumed to induce full participation and,
therefore, no cost reductions are realized.
1 . Coercive-Voluntary Program Analysis
Wages(*): Full minimum wage of
$3.35 per hour for 50 4-hour work
weeks = $6,700
Medical Benefits(*): $44.70
(monthly health insurance average)
x 12 months = $536
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Administrative Costs(*): 10 percent
of annual wages = $670
Training Costs(*): Costs are calcu-
lated using the 4 week "mini-boot
camp" concept and CBO estimates of
training costs. CBO cost estimates
(adjusted for differences in length
of training) are $3,700 per indivi-
dual = $1,850
Operating Costs(*): BAQ and BAS
rates (combined) of $337.50 per
month x 12 months = $4,050
Educational Benefits: None provided =




Physical Examination = $102
Aptitude Testing = $2
Implicit Costs: Calculated in accor-
dance with the formula in Chapter 3.
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V7 = $11,590°' W„ = $10,750. Impli-U II b
cit costs = 2.3128(W^) minus 1.9227(Wno ) = $6,136O II o
Total Cost for One Individual = $20,555
x 3.1725 million participants = $65,211,000,000
Budgeted cost for one individual = $14,419
D. MANDATORY PROGRAM
The only differences between the coercive-voluntary
model and the mandatory programs are the wages paid and the
existence of GI Bill-type benefits under the mandatory
program. Two mandatory models will be compared. The only
difference between the two mandatory programs is the wage
rates. mandatory program one (Ml) assumes a level for base
pay equal to 1973 base pay for an E-2, plus 50 percent of
the difference between the 1973 and 1987 levels of base pay.
Mandatory program two (M2) uses the wage level from HR 2206
adjusted for inflation. The two variations of the mandatory
programs are presented side by side to illustrate the effect
of wages paid on implicit costs and on the overall cost of
the program.
The only other difference between the mandatory pro-
grams and the coercive-voluntary program is the reintroduc-
tion of educational benefits. Educational benefits under Ml
and M2 accrue at a rate of 1-1/2 months of benefits for each
month of service completed. This is at a rate greater than
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that of the voluntary model, but is consistent with current
VA rates.
1 . Mandatory Program Analysis
Wages(*)
Ml M2
Ml wages of $541 per
month x 12 months = $6,492
M2 wages of $321 per
month x 12 months = $3,852
Medical Benefits(*):
$44.70 (monthly health
insurance average) x 12
months = $536 $536
Administrative Costs(*):
10 percent of wages = $649 $385
Training Costs(*): Costs
are calculated using the
4 week "mini-boot camp"
concept and CBO estimates
of training costs. CBO
estimates (adjusted for
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differences in length of
training) are $3,700 per
individual = $1,850 $1,850
Operating Costs(*): BAQ
and BAS rates (combined)
of $337.50 per month x







Assuming a 3 for 2 benefits
to service ratio and parti-
cipation by the expected
50 percent = $2,544 $2,544
(Discounted at 10 percent
for 2 years)
Implicit Costs(*): Cal-
culated in accordance with





w^ml = $12,967; W„ m2 -
ns ' ' ns
$10,446 Implicit Costs =
2.3128 (W
q )
- 1.9227 (W ) = $1,874 $6,721
Total Cost for One Indi-
vidual = $18,608 $20,551
x 3.1725 million parti- $59,034,000,000
cipants $65,198,000,000
Budgeted cost for one
individual $16,734 $13,830
E. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM TOTAL COSTS
Voluntary Program $9,159,000,000
Coercive-Voluntary Program $65,211,000,000
Mandatory Program Ml $59,034,000,000
Mandatory Program M2 $65,198,000,000
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The estimates calculated in this study provide a more
accurate basis for comparing the costs of various types of
national service programs than has previously existed . The
cost of a program includes not only the budgeted cost , but
also the costs borne by the participant, by his family, and
by society in general. The inclusion of some costs, thus
far ignored , helps to arrive at a better estimate for the
cost of each program. Although some costs are only approxi-
mations based on assumptions, the basis for those assump-
tions is sound. The choice of one assumption over another
was not biased by self-interest or by political motivation.
The assumptions that were made were necessary to allow the
calculation of costs.
The estimates yielded two significant findings. First,
if only budgeted costs are considered, the only program that
is within the budgetary limits of the government is the
voluntary program. However, as long as the government has
annual budget deficits in excess of $100 billion, even the
more modest costs of the voluntary program are beyond the
resources of this country unless the deficit increases. If
budget negotiators in the Congress can have difficulty
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agreeing on a deficit reduction package to trim just a few
billion dollars from the deficit, it seems highly unlikely
that they would be able to add any program which increases
expenditures by billions of dollars. Any such increase in
expenditures would not be politically feasible.
The scope alone of the coercive programs places them
outside the realm of realistic alternatives. The cost of
the three larger programs range from $59 billion to over $65
billion ($44 billion to $53 billion budgeted dollars) , while
that of the voluntary program is a more realistic $9
billion
.
It is true that, if the budgeted costs alone are used
as a basis for comparing the programs, the costs are sub-
stantially lower. However, the decision to pursue one
program over another or to select any program should be
based on a comparison of all costs, not selected costs that
are easily manipulated.
Second, while the voluntary program is the least
costly, it is also unrealistic.
Most young people see the future as a number of days or
perhaps a year and make decisions based on that perception.
The study at the University of California at Los Angeles,
referenced previously, points out that the acquisition of
wealth is the top priority of today's youth. In light of
that, providing for a wage level below the existing minimum
wage would eliminate the serious consideration of national
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service as an alternative for the majority of youth. Even
though the non-wage benefits of Eberly's program raise the
value of total compensation to a level well above the mini-
mum wage, the majority of potential participants would not
look past the current benefits, namely their weekly pay-
check. Unfortunately, this is a reflection of our society,
but one which must be dealt with if a workable program is to
be designed.
Training costs used for comparison of the voluntary
model are based on a two-day orientation of each partici-
pant. Since this program is community-based, two days of
orientation to the job may be all that is needed. However,
this would amount to little more than showing the volunteer
what his or her new job will be and could not possibly
generate the feeling of service desired. If the true pur-
pose of the program is not only to provide jobs and to fill
the needs of society, but also to instill a sense of service
in our youth, something more than a two-day orientation
lecture would be needed.
The educational benefits provided by the voluntary
model would barely cover one year's expenses at a public
university. If one goal of the program is to provide mean-
ingful educational benefits to the participant , more bene-
fits are needed. Although education is costly, the benefits
to society would more than return the monies invested.
Higher taxable wages alone would probably return the cost of
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educational benefits to the country's coffers, not to men-
tion the additional services and technological breakthroughs
provided for society in general.
Many participants in a national service program will
almost assuredly be members of the lower class and members
of minority groups. Although national service is not
intended to create a jobs program for poor young people,
"The wealthy simply do not participate.' As Timothy Noah
noted , wealthy , and most upper-middle class young people
will not "voluntarily rush off to the nearest recruiting
office to sign up for a couple of years of low paying regi-
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mented service cleaning bedpans and painting bridges."
They have better, and certainly more profitable, things to
do. Since the upper half of society will likely not parti-
cipate voluntarily without some special incentive or signi-
ficant penalty, the lower half would disproportionately fill
the ranks of any such program. A truly voluntary program
would not include any special incentives or penalties, but
programs could certainly be designed to attract a represen-
tative group. Once such coercive measure currently being
advocated is to add participation in a national service
program to the requirements for a college degree. The
program analyzed is a truly voluntary program since it does
not coerce any particular group in participation.
If the purpose is Utopian and solely to change the
service ethic of society, it will probably not succeed.
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However, if the purpose is more realistic and would be
satisfied with providing poor youth with a job, a chance at
an education, and much needed services to society, it stands
a better chance of success.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The voluntary program is the least costly, has the best
chance of passage in Congress and is probably the least
controversial. The fact remains that it is not designed to
obtain the number of volunteers desired, nor does it present
the costs of the program in their entirety. My own feeling
is that to increase participation to desired levels, to im-
prove the sense of service of participants, and to meet the
majority of the program's stated objectives, the following
program should be used for comparison purposes.
The wage level of participants should be set equal to
the existing minimum wage, $3.35 for analysis purposes.
Assuming the same 50 40-hour work weeks as under Model One
,
this would equate to $6,700 per year.
Medical benefits and administrative costs are assumed
to be the same as under the voluntary program presented by
Eberly. Their values would be $536 and $670, respectively.
Training should not be for two days, but for the four-
week "mini-boot camp" described for the coercive and manda-
tory programs. This would instill the feeling of being a
part of a group working toward a common goal instead of an
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orientation to a new job. The cost of this type of training
would be $1,850, just as it would be in the case of the
other programs.
Educational benefits, to be truly a benefit, must be
perceived as being of substantial value. Working two years
for the equivalent of one year of educational benefits would
not be perceived as a real benefit. To "sweeten the pot,"
educational benefits based on the current 3 months eligibil-
ity for every 2 months of service ratio of the GI Bill
should be incorporated in the program. These benefits would
cost $2,544 annually.
The advertising, physical examination, and "paper and
pencil" testing would all be included in the program and
amount to approximately $219 per year.
Operating costs are dependent on the nature of the pro-
gram. In a community-based plan, Eberly's "live at home"
idea seems to best serve the program. To provide youth with
the equivalent of BAS and BAQ while they will most likely
reside at their parents' house would defeat the purpose of
the payment. In the community-based program, the parents of
the participants would be expected to reach an agreement
with their sons and daughters on living and eating accommo-
dations. The community-based plan has both positive and
negative aspects. The young people may be more interested
in the condition of their own communities than in that of
others. However, if they were relocated while providing
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their service, any negative environmental influences (such
as negative peer pressure, drugs, family problems, and so
on) on them would disappear. The cost to their parents
would be greater under a community-based plan, although the
participants could pay for food and lodging, but the cost to
the government or sponsor would be greater if volunteers
were relocated
.
Although there are benefits to both a community-based
and a noncommunity-based plan, and in all likelihood the
resulting plan would incorporate some of each, the fact
remains that the budgeted cost of the community-based plan
is less and, therefore, it has a better chance of gaining
the legislative support necessary for passage.
Since I believe the community-based plan would receive
the greatest legislative support , no operating costs are
used for analysis purposes.
The total cost of the author's program would be $12,519
per year per individual.
Although the annual cost of this program is $3 billion
more than Eberly's program, it could achieve the desired
results, while Model One would probably not.
I think that if any voluntary national service program
is instituted in this country it should be modeled along the
Tines of the program described in this chapter. However,
although the idea of solving many of the country's problems
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by adding another government program is appealing to some,
it is not appealing to, nor supported by, the author.
As Danzig and Szanton noted, "National service is an
finideal, not a program." National service in it's purest
sense does not translate well into a realistic program. The
more that the coercive measures, benefits, and even wages
are relied upon to gather volunteers, the more that the
actual program will differ from a true service program in
which people volunteer to provide service because they feel
it is the right thing to do. Service is not voluntary in
the traditional sense of that word if it is entered because
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